From: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>

When the SECURE_NOROOT securebit is not set, allow root to keep it's
capabilities over exec, rather than compute the capabilities based on file
capabilities.

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
---

 security/commoncap.c |    6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff -puN security/commoncap.c~file-capabilities-honor-secure_noroot security/commoncap.c
--- a/security/commoncap.c~file-capabilities-honor-secure_noroot
+++ a/security/commoncap.c
@@ -202,12 +202,16 @@ static inline int set_file_caps(struct l
 
 int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
+	int ret;
+
 	/* Copied from fs/exec.c:prepare_binprm. */
 
 	cap_clear (bprm->cap_inheritable);
 	cap_clear (bprm->cap_permitted);
 	cap_clear (bprm->cap_effective);
 
+	ret = set_file_caps(bprm);
+
 	/*  To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
 	 *  executables under compatibility mode, we raise all three
 	 *  capability sets for the file.
@@ -225,7 +229,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_
 			cap_set_full (bprm->cap_effective);
 	}
 
-	return set_file_caps(bprm);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
_